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Abstract.  Description Logics have been extensively studied from the view-
point of decidability and computational tractability.  Less attention has been 
given to their usability and the cognitive difficulties they present, in particular 
for those who are not specialists in logic.  This paper reports on a study into the 
difficulties associated with the most commonly used Description Logic fea-
tures. Psychological theories are used to take account of these. Whilst most of 
the features presented no difficulty to participants, the comprehension of some 
was affected by commonly occurring misconceptions.  The paper proposes ex-
planations and remedies for some of these difficulties.  In addition, the time to 
confirm stated inferences was found to depend both on the maximum complexi-
ty of the relations involved and the number of steps in the argument.   
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1 Introduction 
During the past few decades the decidability and computational tractability of De-
scription Logics (DLs) have been extensively studied. Baader et al. (2010) provide a 
comprehensive overview of the theory of DLs and also describe a number of applica-
tions.  In particular, the properties of the various profiles of OWL, the Web Ontology 
Language, are well understood; see Motik et al. (2012).  The usability of DLs has 
been much less investigated.  This paper describes an experiment to understand the 
comprehensibility of the most commonly used features of DLs, as implemented in 
OWL.  The study has revealed a number of misconceptions and the paper makes sug-
gestions as to how these can be overcome.  A particular goal of the study was to de-
termine whether any of the psychological theories of reasoning could be used to ex-
plain the accuracy of human reasoning with DL statements and the time taken to un-
dertake such reasoning. This theoretical approach has helped to explain the most sig-
nificant of the misconceptions and also explained the time to confirm inferences. 
Section 2 describes related work.  This falls into two categories: work undertaken 
by computer scientists to understand the comprehensibility of DLs; and the work of 
cognitive psychologists to understand the nature of reasoning in general.  Section 3 
then describes how the most commonly used DL features were identified.  The study 
focuses on the features that are commonly used, rather than those features which, 
whilst useful in particular domains, are not extensively used.  Section 4 explains how 
the study was designed and conducted.  Section 5 presents the study questions and 
discusses the five which were found most difficult by participants.  Where applicable 
we have used theories from cognitive science to help explain these difficulties.  Some 
potential remedies for these problems are also suggested.  The section also discusses 
participants’ feedback, which confirm the usefulness of some of the suggestions.  
Section 6 provides a more detailed analysis, including some results relating the time 
taken to answer questions to psychological theories of reasoning.  Finally, section 7 
draws some conclusions and outlines areas for future study. 
2 Related work 
2.1 Comprehensibility of Description Logics 
There have been few studies of the comprehensibility of Description Logics.  Rector 
et al. (2004) describe the difficulties experienced by newcomers to OWL, based on 
their experience in teaching the language.  They provide a set of guidelines and also 
English paraphrases of some OWL expressions.  Horridge et al. (2011) were interest-
ed in supporting the ontology developer during the debugging process.  One way to 
offer such support is to display the minimal subset of the ontology that generates a 
particular entailment.  Such a subset is termed a justification.  Horridge et al. investi-
gated the cognitive complexity of justifications for entailments of OWL ontologies.  
They developed a complexity model and compared the predictions of this model with 
the difficulty experienced by computer scientists in identifying correct entailments.  
Their model, which was not grounded in any psychological theory, “fared reasonably 
well”.  Commenting on a study by Newstead et al. (2006), Horridge et al. identified a 
strong advantage of studies within the psychological literature, i.e. that the problems 
considered “are very constrained and comparatively easy to analyse”.  The difficulty 
in studying DLs is the need to consider a wide range of commonly occurring con-
structs. 
Nguyen et al. (2012) had a similar interest in assisting developers to debug ontolo-
gies.  Their goal was to explain, in English, why an entailment follows from an ontol-
ogy.  In particular, they wished to predict the comprehensibility of alternative proof 
trees, when expressed in English.  To do this they needed to first understand the com-
prehensibility of the individual deduction rules comprising a proof tree.  They took 51 
such deduction rules, expressed in English, and tested their comprehensibility on par-
ticipants obtained through a crowdsourcing service.  This enabled them to generate a 
facility index representing the ease of comprehensibility of each deduction rule, cal-
culated as the proportion of participants who identified the deduction rule as being 
correct.  Since their interest was in calculating these facility indices for future use, 
they did not attempt to create a model to predict and explain the indices. 
2.2 Theories of human reasoning 
There is a considerable psychological literature on human reasoning.  One distinction 
is between rule-based and model-based theories.  The rule-based approach is repre-
sented by the work of Rips, e.g. Rips (1983).  The assumption is that the processes of 
human reasoning are akin to the steps executed by a logician in carrying out a proof.  
The model-based approach is represented by Johnson-Laird, e.g. Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (1991), for whom mental models “have the same structure as human concep-
tions of the situations they represent”.  Johnson-Laird and his collaborators have built 
an extensive body of experimental evidence to support the view that at least ‘naïve 
reasoners’ (i.e. people not trained in logic), do use mental models in reasoning.  It 
may be, though, that some people use a mixture of mental models and rules-based 
reasoning, depending upon the particular situation and their degree of training in log-
ic.  Our hypothesis is that when logicians are constructing a proof in a rule-based way, 
they use mental models at some or all of the deduction steps. 
The mental model theorists propose that difficulties in reasoning often occur when 
several models need to be maintained in working memory.  It is suggested that in 
certain situations people may ignore some of the possible models, thereby leading to 
errors.  This may happen, for example, when a disjunction occurs.  Moreover, mental 
model theory suggests that an inclusive disjunction will give rise to more errors than 
an exclusive disjunction, since the former requires three models to be held in working 
memory whilst the latter requires only two.  This is borne out by experiment, e.g. see 
Johnson-Laird et al. (1992). 
Relational complexity (RC) theory offers another approach to understanding per-
formance in reasoning.  Here complexity is defined “as a function … of the number of 
variables that can be related in a single cognitive representation”, i.e. the number of 
arguments of a relation (Halford & Andrews, 2004).  The theory proposes that it is the 
maximum relational complexity in a given process of reasoning which determines the 
difficulty of that reasoning.  RC theory could be seen as compatible with either the 
rule-based or the model-based approach.  Zielinski et al. (2010) have attempted to 
reconcile the mental model and RC theories for categorical syllogisms.  Goodwin and 
Johnson-Laird (2005) have combined mental model theory and RC theory in their 
study of reasoning about relations.  Apart from the number of arguments, they see 
depth of the relation as contributing to complexity.  Relations between individuals are 
regarded as of first-order depth; relations between relations of second-order depth; 
relations between relations between relations of third-order depth.   
It seems likely that the experimental success of the mental model theory, e.g. as 
described in Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) and Johnson-Laird et al. (1992), arises 
because the individual models were of broadly equal complexity.  As a consequence, 
situations requiring two models created more difficulty than those requiring one, and 
situations requiring three models were even more difficult.   
3 Identifying the commonly used features 
To identify the most commonly used features we drew on four sources.  Power and 
Third (2010) provide a list of the most commonly used OWL functors based on an 
analysis of ontologies in the TONES Ontology Repository1.  Power (2010) also used 
TONES to identify common axiom patterns.  This identified the frequency of use of 
Boolean operators such as intersection, and also of the existential and universal re-
strictions.  Khan and Blomqvist (2010) searched 682 online ontologies to determine 
the frequency of occurrence of content patterns from the ODP (ontology design pat-
tern) portal2.  This portal provides information on a variety of patterns, including 
around 100 content patterns.  These are essentially small autonomous solutions to 
particular design problems.  We then analyzed the 20 most frequent patterns that they 
detected, to determine the commonly occurring OWL features.  In addition, Warren 
(2013) undertook a survey of ontology users which included a question about the 
usage of OWL features.  Based on 47 responses to this question, these features were 
ranked by frequency of reported use. 
The resultant lists were then compared.  They identified broadly the same set of 
commonly occurring features.  There were a few differences, e.g. Power and Third 
found class equivalence to be the second most commonly used functor; analysis of the 
common content patterns from Khan and Blomqvist identified class equivalence as 
the thirteenth most commonly used OWL feature, whilst it was not included in the 
survey by Warren.  The set of features used in this study consisted of all those fea-
tures which were relatively common in at least one of these lists, with two exceptions.  
The reason for these exceptions was that the study participants would not necessarily 
be familiar with OWL and they would need to be given information about the lan-
guage which should be kept brief.  Firstly, all features relating to datatype properties 
were ignored.  It was felt that datatype properties would present no cognitive chal-
lenges that could not be represented with object properties.  This is not to say that 
there might not be challenges arising from datatype properties during the learning 
process, but rather that subsequently, when working with ontologies, they do not give 
rise to any specific problems of cognition.  Secondly, cardinality restrictions were not 
included.  In fact, these did not occur in the list of most commonly used patterns in 
Power and were ranked relatively low in the survey by Warren.  The ‘min 1’ cardinal-
ity restriction did occur moderately frequently in the patterns identified by Khan and 
Blomqvist.  This states that a particular individual is the subject of at least one in-
stance of a particular property.  It is equivalent to an existential restriction, which was 
included in the study. 
Table 1 shows the set of OWL features chosen for the study.  In each case the 
Manchester OWL Syntax (MOS) representation of the language feature is also shown 
(Horridge et al., 2006).  The features are grouped into those relevant to classes, those 
relevant to properties and the existential and universal restrictions.  In each of these 
groupings, they are listed broadly in order of occurrence (i.e. with most commonly 
1  http://rpc295.cs.man.ac.uk:8080/repository/ 
2  http://ontologydesignpatterns.org/wiki/Main_Page 
                                                          
occurring at the top), although, as already noted, rankings differed across the various 
sources. 
Table 1. Commonly used OWL features investigated in the study 
 
4 The study 
In order to test comprehension of these OWL features, they were incorporated into a 
set of twenty-one questions based on three patterns from the the ODP portal (see be-
ginning of previous section).  The three patterns used were: Componency, Copartici-
pation, and Types of Entities; the second and third were modified to enable all the 
features in table 1 to be tested, with some simplification of the second to remove un-
necessary statements.  The three modified patterns were associated with ten, six and 
five questions.  Each of the questions consisted of a set of statements and a proposed 
inference.  The participant was required to indicate, by clicking on a button, whether 
the inference was or was not valid.  In all there were thirteen questions with valid 
inferences and eight where the inference was not valid.  The patterns and question 
statements were expressed in a simplified form of the Manchester OWL Syntax.  
Classes and properties were defined in the patterns and had intuitive names.  Individ-
uals were defined in the questions and were named A, B, C, D.   
These patterns and questions were incorporated in a test, using the tool SurveyEx-
pression3.  The three patterns were ordered in all six permutations; each of these per-
mutations existed in a form with the ‘yes’ option first and with the ‘no’ option first, to 
safeguard against any bias from the order of the possible answers.  Thus there were 
twelve variants of the test.  There were also twelve participants, i.e. one participant 
per variant.  All the participants, of whom three were female, were researchers at the 
Centre for Research in Computing or the Knowledge Media Institute at the Open 
University, U.K.  Screen capture software was used to record the participant’s behav-
iour and in particular to provide the precise times spent in each question.  The partici-
pants were observed as they took part in the study and any comments they made were 
noted. 
The study was organized into five sections.  In the first section participants were 
asked to rate their knowledge of logic and of OWL.  The wording and the percentage 
3  http://www.surveyexpression.com/ 
                                                          
of responses in each category for logic and OWL respectively were: no knowledge at 
all (0%,0%); a little knowledge, e.g. from an introductory course in formal logic 
(17%,25%); some knowledge, e.g. from a university course in formal logic 
(67%,42%); expert knowledge (17%,33%).  The next three sections contained the 
three patterns and the questions.  Each section began with a webpage displaying the 
pattern and then a series of pages, with each page repeating the pattern and containing 
one question.  Participants were able to move through the pages at their own speed.  
The final section was an opportunity for the participants to provide feedback.  Partici-
pants were provided with a handout containing all the necessary information about the 
OWL features and notation used.  They were asked to read this at the beginning and it 
was available to them for reference during the session. 
5 Study results 
5.1 The difficult questions 
Of the 21 questions, eight were answered correctly by all of the participants, four 
were answered correctly by all but one of the participants, and a further four were 
answered correctly by all but two of the participants.  The remaining five are dis-
cussed here in decreasing order of difficulty.  Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the three pat-
terns and the associated questions.  The columns headed ‘yes/no’, ‘MM’ and ‘RC’ 
represent the correct answer, the maximum number of mental models and the maxi-
mum relational complexity associated with the question.  The column headed ‘num 
steps’ shows the number of steps to arrive at a correct deduction for questions with 
answer ‘yes’.  The remaining two columns show the percentage of correct responses 
and the average time for each question. 
Table 2. Questions based on the modified entity types pattern 
 
Table 2: Q2 - Complementing the and operation (ans: no; 25% correct responses) 
The most direct way of arriving at a ‘no’ conclusion for this question is to note that, 
since Event and Quality are disjoint classes, then Event and Quality must be Nothing 
(⊥).  Hence not (Event and Quality) is Thing (⊤) and the statement A Type not (Event 
and Quality) is tautological. 
The question should be contrasted with question Q4 in table 2, which is identical in 
form except for the replacement of the and with or, and has correct answer ‘yes’.  Q4 
had 92% correct responses and was answered much more quickly; the average re-
sponse time was 44 seconds for Q4 and 75 seconds for Q2.  It is interesting to com-
pare these results with those of Khemlani et al. (2012a), reporting on an experiment 
with ‘naïve reasoners’.  They investigated the comprehension of compound sentences 
of the form not (A and B) and not (A or B) and found a similar wide gap in accuracy 
of answering questions: 18% correct for the negated conjunction and 89% correct for 
the negated disjunction.  They interpret these results in terms of the mental model 
theory.  not (A or B) consists of only one mental model, i.e. not A and not B.  Howev-
er, not (A and B) consists of three mental models: not A and not B; A and not B; not A 
and B.  They suggest that many people do not go beyond constructing the first of 
these, leading to erroneous reasoning.  They elaborate this theory of negation in 
(Khemlani, Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 2012b).  In fact, in both Q2 and Q4, arguably 
four mental models are required, representing the decomposition of Entity (Event or 
Abstract or Quality or Object). The problem is not simply one of managing a number 
of different models, but of the difficulty of creating the full set of models in the nega-
tion process.  In Q4 all the participant has to do is to erase Event and Quality from the 
decomposition of Entity, leaving Abstract and Object.  In Q2, rather than evaluate 
Event and Quality and then not (Event and Quality) as proposed in the paragraph 
above, many participants may attempt to expand not (Event and Quality) and may 
arrive at a single mental model corresponding to the term not Event and not Quality.   
Apart from emphasis during training, potential solutions to this problem are: 
• automatic expansion of not (A and B) into its three atomic constituents; 
• an automatically generated graphical representation. 
There is also the additional possibility of confusion between the everyday use of 
and and its logical use.  It may be that, when faced with the difficulty of negating a 
conjunction, participants take the easy option by interpreting and as equivalent to or 
(e.g. as in the English statement “the car is available in blue and silver”).  The use of 
an alternative keyword to and, e.g. intersection or int, could avoid this linguistic con-
fusion. 
Whatever the reason for the erroneous treatment of Q2, it is striking that the results 
for naïve reasoners were so similar to those found amongst our participants.  This 
suggests that both groups were using the same mental processes. 
The complement operation was used by 22 of the 47 respondents to the question on 
DL feature usage in the survey by Warren (2013).  However, it was not identified by 
Power (2010) as being commonly used and was not in the commonly used patterns 
identified by Khan and Blomqvist (2010).  This relatively low usage may account for 
the low proportion of correct responses, since some participants may not have been 
familiar with the use of the complement operation. 
Table 3.   Questions based on the componency pattern 
 
Table 3: Q4 - Non-inheritance of transitivity (ans: no; 33% correct responses) 
In the pattern, has_component is defined as a subproperty of has_part, which is de-
fined to be transitive.  For the deduction to be true it would be necessary for 
has_component to also be transitive.  There are a number of reasons why this question 
might be answered incorrectly.  It may be that participants forget which is the parent, 
transitive property, and which is the subproperty, i.e. that they confuse the two names.  
It might also be that the name has_component suggests transitivity.  Alternatively, 
people may assume that property characteristics are necessarily inherited by subprop-
erties.  This would be natural for people coming from an object oriented background, 
or those chiefly used to thinking about class subsumption relations in ontologies.  
That this is not the case for transitivity was noted in the handout, which cited the ex-
ample of the property is_descendant_of and its subproperty is_child_of4.  In fact, a 
different choice of property name might guard against all these problems; 
has_direct_part, in place of has_component, could better convey the required mean-
ing.  Subproperties appear to be relatively frequently used, and the transitive charac-
teristic is one of the most commonly used characteristics.  When training ontology 
users, attention needs to be drawn to the fact that not all characteristics are inherited, 
perhaps spelling out those which are and those which are not. 
Table 2: Q3 - The functional characteristic (ans: yes; 50% correct responses) 
Since Object and Event are disjoint, B and D must be different.  The functionality 
of represents then ensures that A and C are different.  It may be that those who an-
swered this question incorrectly did not fully understand the nature of a functional 
characteristic, despite it being explained in the handout.  It may also be that the high 
relational complexity (i.e. RC = 4) of the question contributed to its difficulty.  Here 
again, a diagrammatic representation would aid comprehension. 
Table 4.   Questions based on the modified coparticipation pattern 
 
4  Similarly, the characteristic of symmetry is not inherited, as can be seen from the property 
is_sibling_of and its subproperty is_brother_of.  On the other hand, functionality is inherit-
ed, since if a subproperty has two values for the same subject, then so will its superproperty. 
                                                          
Table 4: Q6 - The existential quantifier  (ans: yes; 67% correct responses) 
Each member of the class Game has_participant some Player; hence this is true of 
A.  Since Player is a subclass of Object, A has_participant some Object.  Since Event 
is defined as the set of individuals that has_participant some Object, A is in Event.  
The fact that a relatively large number of participants got this question right, despite 
its apparent complexity, may be due to the frequency of use of the existential quanti-
fier, e.g. see  Khan and Blomqvist (2010), Power (2010) and Warren (2013). 
Table 2: Q5 - Superclasses (ans: yes; 75% correct responses) 
Participants did relatively well on the question, only two providing incorrect an-
swers and one not responding.  In all the analyses the non-response is treated as an 
incorrect answer.  The question is discussed here in part because it provides an exam-
ple of a different approach to the use of mental models.  Entity is composed of four 
disjoint subclasses.  Nonconceptual and Nontemporal comprise two and three of these 
disjoint subclasses respectively.  The only one they have in common is Object; hence 
their conjunction is equivalent to Object.  A straightforward application of the mental 
model approach suggests that the maximum number of mental models is three, since 
Nontemporal is comprised of three disjoint classes.  There is, however, little difficulty 
in formulating these models, unlike in the case of negation of a conjunction in table 2, 
Q2.  In fact, a quite natural way to think about this is as two overlapping superclasses, 
with Object constituting the overlapping portion.  This also lends itself naturally to a 
graphical representation; some participants might even have visualized it.  This only 
requires that two models be held in working memory, one representing Nonconceptu-
al, and the other Nontemporal. 
5.2 Participants’ feedback.  
After completing the questions, participants were able to provide written feedback 
about what they found difficult and what they found easy, and to make general com-
ments.  Some participants also made comments verbally.  The most common theme 
was the use of intuition, in particular relating to names.  There were conflicting views.  
One participant (p1) commented that “using named individuals instead of capital let-
ters would have been easier” whilst another (p2) held the opinion that it was “easy to 
reason with anonymous things”, since this safeguarded against the danger of using 
intuition rather than relying on the formal axioms.  The contrasting views were also 
present when considering class and property names.  One participant (p3) commented 
that because the class and property names were familiar it was necessary to check 
whether the meaning in the OWL expression was similar to the normal English usage; 
another (p4) stated that “the axioms were realistic so one could rely to some extent on 
common sense”.  Participant p1 also commented favourably on the lack of use of 
formal logic symbols, which is a feature of the Manchester OWL syntax. 
Four participants commented on the value of diagrams.  Here there were no con-
flicting views but a consensus that diagrams are useful, e.g. participant p3 stated: 
“perhaps I would have done better if I’d drawn diagrams on paper” and another par-
ticipant (p5) commented: “a pictorial representation of the relationships would have 
been easier to use”.  Indeed, the automatic generation of diagrams is likely to have 
helped comprehension in all the questions discussed above.  One participant (p6) 
expressed a related view that colour-coding for OWL entity types and font weights 
and styles for keywords would be useful. 
There were some interesting comments about OWL features, including the difficul-
ty of using the existential and universal quantifiers (participant p1); confusion be-
tween and and or (participant p3, see Q2 from table 1 discussed in subsection 5.1); 
and (participant p7) the effect of users’ legacy, e.g. that of a database background.  
Each of these comments is relevant to one of the questions discussed in section 5.1. 
6 Statistical analysis 
6.1 The participants 
The majority of participants achieved high scores; two achieved twenty out of twenty-
one, whilst the lowest score was thirteen.  Ranking on knowledge of logic and OWL 
significantly correlates with ranking on accuracy.  The Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient between knowledge of logic and accuracy was 0.53, corresponding to p = 
0.038 on a one-tailed t test.  For the correlation between knowledge of OWL and ac-
curacy, the coefficient was 0.54, corresponding to p = 0.036 on a one-tailed t test.  
The effect was greater when we consider just the questions with correct answer ‘yes’.  
For these questions, the correlation factor was 0.57 (p = 0.027) for knowledge of logic 
and 0.60 (p = 0.019) for knowledge of OWL.  For the ‘no’ questions the rank correla-
tion with knowledge of logic and knowledge of OWL were no longer significant (p = 
0.052 and p = 0.102 respectively).  The number of participants did not permit a statis-
tical analysis on a per-question basis.  None of the participants classifying themselves 
as having a little knowledge of either logic or OWL answered correctly the first two 
questions discussed in section 5.1, i.e. the two questions with fewest accurate re-
sponses.  However, there were also some experts who got these questions wrong.   
There was considerable variation in the total time taken to answer the questions, 
ranging from around thirteen minutes to around forty-two minutes.  For our partici-
pants, knowledge of OWL had a much greater effect on the total time taken than did 
knowledge of logic.  For knowledge of OWL the Spearman rank correlation coeffi-
cient was -0.65, with p = 0.011 on a one-tailed t test; for knowledge of logic the coef-
ficient was -0.29, with p = 0.178.  The low correlation in the case of knowledge of 
logic may have occurred because the majority (67%) of our participants ranked them-
selves in the same category (‘some knowledge’). 
6.2 The questions 
Most of the questions were answered correctly by all or most of the participants, 
with an apparent tendency to achieve greater accuracy on the questions with correct 
answer ‘yes’.  Table 5 provides a breakdown of the responses showing how many 
were correct and incorrect for the two categories of questions; it also shows the aver-
age times for each combination.  A Pearson χ2 test confirmed the greater accuracy on 
the ‘yes’ questions (p = 0.005).  The greater accuracy for the ‘yes’ questions occurs 
despite the fact that the average maximum relational complexity for these questions is 
greater than that for the ‘no’ questions, i.e. they appear on average to be harder. 
Table 5.   Breakdown of responses, also showing average times in each category 
 
The time spent by any participant answering a single question varied from 9 seconds 
to 208 seconds, the average time across all participants for each of the twenty-two 
question varied from 20.3 seconds to 91.5 seconds.  A two sample one-sided unpaired 
t test indicated that the ‘yes’ questions were answered on average significantly more 
quickly than the ‘no’ questions (p < 0.001).  This may represent a tendency to initially 
attempt to prove the validity of the deduction.  After first such attempts fail, the par-
ticipant then has two possible strategies: either to continue such attempts until con-
vinced that a proof is not possible or to attempt to prove explicitly that the deduction 
does not hold.  The strategy adopted is likely to depend upon the person and the par-
ticular question.  A one-sided unpaired t test also indicated that the correct responses 
were arrived at significantly more quickly than the incorrect responses (p < 0.001).  
Thus there was no trade-off between accuracy and speed of response.  A two-way 
ANOVA indicated that the two factors did not interact (p = 0.884).  Hence the correct 
responses to the ‘yes’ questions averaged the least time (43.4 seconds) whilst the 
incorrect responses to the ‘no’ questions averaged the greatest time (76.3 seconds). 
A simple linear regression showed that, overall, questions with a large number of 
correct responses were answered more quickly than questions with fewer correct re-
sponses (p < 0.001).  This was also true when analysis was restricted to those ques-
tions with correct answer ‘yes’ (p < 0.001) and also to all those questions correctly 
answered (p = 0.001).  However, there was no significant relationship between time 
and number of correct responses for those questions where the correct answer was 
‘no’ (p = 0.349), nor for the incorrectly answered questions (p = 0.947).   
6.3 Theories of reasoning 
As already noted, an objective was to determine whether any of the psychological 
theories could be used to predict, in terms of accuracy and time, the behaviour of our 
participants, and thus whether any of these theories would be useful in understanding 
how people reason about DLs.  Each question was analyzed to determine the maxi-
mum number of mental models and maximum relational complexity which it would 
entail; as shown in tables 2, 3 and 4.  For the questions with correct answer ‘yes’, this 
was done by constructing the proof of the deduction, and determining the number of 
mental models and the relational complexity at each stage.  The questions with correct 
answer ‘no’ were examined to determine the maximum number of mental models and 
maximum relational complexity which would be met in thinking about them. 
Only three questions required more than one mental model, making any statistical 
analysis impossible.  One (table 2, Q2) was a ‘no’ question requiring four mental 
models and was the least well answered, with only three correct responses; this ques-
tion is discussed at the beginning of subsection 5.1.  The other two were ‘yes’ ques-
tions requiring four (table 2, Q4) and three mental models (table 2, Q5) and with 11 
and 9 correct responses; the second of these is also discussed in subsection 5.1.  
Moreover, whilst these three questions might be regarded as requiring more than one 
mental model, a participant with some knowledge of logic might well have used an 
alternative approach.  The prevalence of questions requiring only one mental model 
seems to arise from the way in which Description Logics are used.  The complexity is 
often in the relations, rather than in the existence of numerous possibilities. 
This last statement might lead one to expect that relational complexity would be a 
better predictor of performance.  However, a logistic regression of accuracy against 
maximum relational complexity did not provide a significant result (p = 0.665).  This 
was also the case for a linear regression of time to answer each question versus max-
imum relational complexity (p = 0.861).  When the latter regression was limited to the 
‘yes’ questions, then there was a significant result (p = 0.009).  The difference be-
tween ‘yes’ and ‘no’ questions may be a feature of the way people approach ‘no’ 
questions, or it may arise from the design of questions; all but one ‘no’ question had 
relational complexity of 2. 
The rule-based theory leads one to expect that, for the ‘yes’ questions, performance 
might be predicted by the number of steps in the reasoning chain.  Whatever the va-
lidity of this theory is for naïve reasoners in everyday life, it could have some rele-
vance to our participants, all of whom had at least a little knowledge of logic.  This 
was investigated by looking at the 13 ‘yes’ questions.  It might be expected that, as 
the number of steps in the reasoning chain increases, the accuracy of answering will 
decline, as the possibility of error multiplies and fatigue sets in.  A logistic regression 
of accuracy against number of steps did not provide a significant result (p = 0.355).  
However, all questions had one, two or three steps, with the exception of Q10 of table 
3 which had four steps and was correctly answered by all participants.  When this 
question is removed from the analysis, a significant result is achieved (p = 0.046).   
A linear regression of time for each response against number of steps also provided 
a significant result (p = 0.036).  This was slightly more significant when only the 
correct responses were analyzed (p = 0.028), but not significant for the incorrect re-
sponses (p = 0.360).  The mean times for one, two, three and four step questions were 
25.5, 51.9, 44.3 and 54.2 seconds respectively.  A Tukey range test at the 95% level 
indicated a significant difference between the means of only the first two groups. 
7 Conclusions and future work 
This study represents an attempt to understand the cognitive difficulties of using De-
scription Logics.  A key message is that, despite training, users are prone to certain 
misconceptions.  These include confusion about the combined use of not and and; 
about the inheritance of property characteristics; and to a lesser extent about the func-
tional characteristic and also the existential quantifier.  Confusion may also arise 
through choice of names, a point taken up in the comments made by participants.  The 
use of realistic names can lead to erroneous intuitions; however the mnemonic ad-
vantage is likely to outweigh this disadvantage.  The important thing is to use names 
which are not likely to create incorrect intuitions. 
In the study, maximal relational complexity did not significantly affect accuracy 
but did significantly affect the time to confirm an inference.  The number of steps in a 
reasoning chain affected the time to reason and also, when one question was removed 
from the analysis, affected the accuracy of reasoning.  Given the participants’ back-
ground and the nature of the questions, it seems likely that they did at the conscious 
level adopt a rule-based approach, as evidenced by the effect of number of steps on 
accuracy and time.  The fact that one-third of the respondents commented on the val-
ue of drawing a diagram indicates that they were also thinking in terms of models. 
There are a number of different areas for further investigation.  The effect of alter-
native linguistic usages is a valuable area for study.  This applies to keywords, entity 
names and the structure of logical statements.  For the non-logician the Manchester 
OWL Syntax appears to offer a considerable improvement over formal logical nota-
tion, as evidenced by one of the participants’ comments.  However, the choice of 
linguistic terms can have a significant effect on cognition, e.g. see Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (1989); this has not been systematically studied in the context of Description 
Logics.  Allied to this is the effect of the way the linguistic terms are displayed, e.g. 
with the use of colour coding.   
The value of diagrams in reasoning has been noted by other researchers.  Larkin 
and Simon (1987) have analysed the benefits of diagrams in terms of support for 
search, recognition and inference.  The importance of the design of diagrams has been 
pointed out by Bauer and Johnson-Laird (1993) who noted the need to avoid arbitrary 
symbols and make explicit alternative states of affairs.  In the context of DLs, dia-
grams offer a strategy to overcome misconceptions and generally support reasoning.  
In fact, a large number of tools have been created to display ontological structures, 
e.g. see Katifori et al. (2007).  These are chiefly aimed at viewing the structure of the 
overall ontology or parts of the ontology, i.e. at the subsumption relations, rather than 
the more cognitively difficult features of Description Logics.  An exception to this is 
the work of Howse et al. (2011) who use concept diagrams not only to view subsump-
tion relations but also to view and reason about role restrictions.  The most successful 
such representations may mirror the mental models we construct when reasoning, so 
this work should also draw on what is known about such mental models and what is 
known about the role of diagrams in complementing reasoning. 
A valuable experimental strategy would be to compare the current approach with a 
modified linguistic approach and with a diagrammatic approach, and possibly with a 
combination of the last two. 
Finally, a better understanding of the effect of complexity would require a con-
trolled study in which questions of varying complexity are posed with a limited subset 
of OWL features which are known to be well understood, to avoid any confounding 
of complexity with differences in comprehension of different logical features. 
In each case a better understanding of the participant’s thought processes is need-
ed.  Follow-up questions to specifically elucidate this would be valuable. 
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